The Case of Circumstantial Evidence, Risk , Possibility and Probability
We are prohibited from executing punishment on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence, even if it be close to absolute certainty.
For example, if one were pursuing another man to kill him, and he ran into a house with the pursuer at his heels, and we came in after them and found the pursued man in the throes of death, with his foe the pursuer, standing over him with knife in hand, and both covered with blood – the Sanhedrin may not execute the pursuer in fulfillment of the penalty, there being no corroboration by witnesses to the murder. As the Torah states: v’naki v’tzadik al taharog ki lo atzdik rasha, A clean one and a righteous on you shall not kill. (Shmos 23:7)
The Midrash says:
If they saw him pursuing another to kill him and they warned him: “He is a Jew, a son of the covenant; if you kill him, you will be killed” – and they averted their eyes and then found him [the pursued] slain, in the death throes, the knife dripping blood in the killer’s hand – I would think that he [the pursuer] were liable [to execution]; it is, therefore, written: “ A clean one and a righteous one you shall not kill.” (Mekhilta)
The Rambam writes in the Sefer ha’Mitzvos (Negative Commandment 290):
… That you should not find this mitzvah difficult or misguided. In the realm of possibility some things are highly probable and some are highly improbable and some are in the area between these two. The realm of the possible is extremely broad. If the Torah allowed execution of punishment on the basis of the highly probable approaching certainty we would come to execute punishment in cases less probable than that and in instances even less probable than that until punishment would be executed and men wrongly killed on the barest surmise of the judge’s imagination. Therefore, God closed the door and commanded that no punishment be executed until eyewitnesses testified that the event had occurred without a doubt and that it cannot be interpreted otherwise. If we do not execute punishment on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence, the worst that can happen is that we exonerate a guilty man. But if we act upon such evidence, it is possible that one day an innocent man will be killed. It is more desirable to exonerate a thousand guilty men than to kill one innocent one.
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"We are prohibited from executing punishment on the basis of strong circumstantial evidence, even if it be close to absolute certainty".
Besides in Sefer haMisvot( from which you quoted further down in your post), it is also brought in Mishneh torah, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 20:1( there is also an English translation).
On the other hand, Hilkhot Melakhim uMilchamot 3:11[10] says that a king can do so. In English translation:
"A murderer against whom the evidence is not totally conclusive, or who was not warned before he slew his victim, or even one who was observed by only one witness, and similarly, an enemy who inadvertently killed one of his foes - the king is granted license to execute them and to improve society according to the needs of the time".
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