Who is Superior? The Chasid who does not desire to sin or the Man who controls himself from sinning?
The Rambam asks this question in the sixth chapter of Shemonah Perakim, his introduction to Avos.
The philosophers say that the person who does not desire to sin is on a higher level. It is better not to desire murder or stealing or sexual immorality than to desire these sins and refrain from them.
The Chakhamim say:
Whoever is greater than his friend has a greater evil impulse than he.
le’fum tza’a’ra agra, according to the pain, so is the reward.
Who is strong? The man who controls his passions – ay’ze’hu gibor? Ha’kovesh es yitzro.
Man should not say:
I do not want to eat meat with milk
I do not want to wear sha’atnez, garments with linen and wool
I do not want to have illicit sexual relations
Rather Man should say: I want to, but what shall I do – my Father in heaven has forbidden me.
According to the Rambam, the resolution to the conflict between the ideas of the philosophers and the Chakhamim is contained in the words of the Chakhamim.
The Chakhamim say that the things the philosophers use as examples of sin are generally accepted laws of morality, such as, murder, theft, robbery, fraud, harming an innocent man, repaying a benefactor with evil, degrading parents and the like.
Regarding these laws of morality the Chakhamim say:
If they were not written down in the Torah, they would deserve to be written down.
Note, the Chakhamim did not say:
I do not want to kill
I do not want to steal
I do not want to lie, but I want to – but what shall I do?
On the contrary, the Chakhamim only mention statutes, chukim, that have no apparent reason, such as, meat with milk, sha’atnez and illicit sexual relations.
The Rambam’s resolution of the difference between the philosophers and Chazal is difficult. Should a person have to struggle his entire life against his passions and be in constant turmoil? The answer is no. At the end of his life that person would be like a shmatteh, a worn out rag, to use the analogy given by Rav Aharon Lichtenstein.
Rather, the goal of Man should be to mold his personality according to the mitzvos of the Torah to the point where his will agrees with the will of God. The struggle ends at some point and Man’s will is in consonance with the mitzvos.
One might ask: Perhaps we have come full circle back to the view of the philosophers that it is better not to desire to sin even for chukim? Yes and no. Yes, it is better not to desire to sin. No, the reason he does not desire to sin is not for the same reason as the philosophers. Namely, Man should not desire to sin because it morally wrong alone. If the only reason to refrain from sin is because it is morally wrong, why do we need the Torah?
Man should not desire to sin because God commanded it, as well. Man has to know and follow the mitzvos because the Torah says so – because there is a metzaveh, a Commander. Gadol ha’me’tzuveh v’oseh me’eino me’tzuveh v’oseh – the person who is commanded is higher than the person who is not commanded.
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7 comments:
Question #1: You wrote: “The Rambam’s resolution of the difference between the philosophers and Chazal is difficult. Should a person have to struggle his entire life against his passions and be in constant turmoil? The answer is no . . . Rather, the goal of Man should be to mold his personality according to the mitzvos of the Torah to the point where his will agrees with the will of God. The struggle ends at some point and Man’s will is in consonance with the mitzvos.”
My question is: what happened to “whoever is greater than his friend has a greater evil impulse than he” and “Man should not say, ‘I do not want . . .’ rather, Man should say, ‘I want . . . but what shall I do – my Father in heaven has forbidden me’”? You write: “Yes, it is better not to desire to sin [even for the chukim].” How do you reconcile that with Chazal’s statements that it IS good to desire to violate the chukim? In other words, Chazal are making a clear statement about SOME class of mitzvos that it is better to desire to do the prohibited behavior than not; the Rambam answered that the said class of mitzvos is the chukim – but you seem to be undermining the Rambam’s whole answer by saying that it is really better NOT to desire to violate the chukim!
Am I missing something?
Question #2: You wrote: “Man should not desire to sin because God commanded it, as well. Man has to know and follow the mitzvos because the Torah says so – because there is a metzaveh, a Commander.”
In the Hakdama to the Peirush al Perek Chelek the Rambam discusses the idea of lishmah. In this discussion, he identifies WHY we should keep the mitzvos. Although my question will only be fully understood if one reads the entire section about lishmah, the essential part is here:
“All of this the Sages considered she’lo lishmah, meaning to say that he fulfills the mitzvos and does them and learns and strives, NOT FOR THE SAKE OF THAT THING ITSELF, BUT FOR THE SAKE OF ANOTHER THING . . . the purpose of one’s learning should be nothing other than the knowledge itself. And similarly: the purpose of the truth is none other than to know that it is true, AND THE MITZVOS ARE TRUE – THEREFORE, THEIR PURPOSE IS THEIR FULFILLMENT.”
My question for you is: why didn’t the Rambam simply write, “We should keep the mitzvos because God commanded them”? Instead, the Rambam juxtaposes two statements: “the purpose of the truth is none other than to know that it is true, and the mitzvos are true – therefore, their purpose is their fulfillment” – what is he getting at with this juxtaposition?
Question #3 (on the same statement of yours: “Man should not, etc.”): Permit me to go even further. (I am warning you: this question will SOUND heretical, but I assure you, it is not.) The Rambam characterizes the fulfillment of a mitzvah “not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of another thing” as she’lo lishmah. This should lead us to ask: isn’t fulfilling a mitzvah BECAUSE GOD COMMANDED IT considered “not for the sake of that thing itself, but for the sake of another thing”? In other words, it seems that according to the Rambam, keeping a mitzvah FOR THE SAKE OF THE MITZVAH would be lishmah, but keeping a mitzvah FOR THE SAKE OF THE COMMANDER would be she’lo lishmah.
I admit that this sounds radical, but I believe it is supported by the Rambam’s discourse on lishmah and she’lo lishmah. I believe it is also supported by David ha’Melech: “I will safeguard Your statutes (chukim), O, do not forsake me utterly” (Tehilim 119:8). The Meiri interprets the phrase “I will safeguard your statutes” as “I will safeguard your statutes exceedingly, with the utmost degree of safeguarding, AS IF THEY WERE MANDATED BY THE INTELLECT.” Apparently, David ha’Melech (at least, according to the Meiri) maintained that the highest level of “shmiras ha’mitzvos” is NOT keeping them because God commanded them, but because one understands the reasons behind them with such clarity and truth that he is compelled by his intellect to keep them – even if God had not commanded them. This is in line with the foregoing implication from the Peirush ha’Mishnayos.
My question for you is: when you write that "Man has to know and follow the mitzvos because the Torah says so – because there is a metzaveh, a Commander" what do you mean, and how do you reconcile your statement with the Rambam's definitions of lishmah and she'lo lishmah?
Lastly (and this is not a question, but a comment), you write “Man should not desire to sin because it morally wrong alone. If the only reason to refrain from sin is because it is morally wrong, why do we need the Torah?”
Saadia Gaon asks a similar question in the introduction to Emunos v’Deos (Yale University Press ed. p.31) regarding the contents of the Torah:
“It consists of the question: ‘Inasmuch as all matters of religious belief, as imparted to us by our Master, can be attained by means of research and correct speculation, what was the reason that prompted [divine] wisdom to transmit them to us by way of prophecy and support them by means of visible proofs and miracles rather than intellectual demonstrations?’ To this question we should like to give, with the help of God, exalted be He, an adequate answer. We say, then, [that] the All-Wise knew that the conclusions reached by means of the art of speculation could be attained only in the course of a certain measure of time. If, therefore, He had referred us for our acquaintance with His religion to that art alone, we would have remained without religious guidance whatever for a while, until the process of reasoning was completed by us so that we could make use of its conclusions. But many a one of us might never complete the process because of some flaw in his reasoning. Again he might not succeed in making use of its conclusions because he is overcome by worry or overwhelmed by uncertainties that confused him and befuddle him. That is why God, exalted and magnified be He, afforded us a quick relief from all these burdens by sending us His messengers through whom he transmitted messages to us, and by letting us see with our own eyes the signs and the proofs supporting them about which no doubt could prevail and which we could not possibly reject . . .
“Thus it became incumbent upon us immediately to accept the religion, together with all that was embraced in it, because its authenticity had been proven by the testimony of the senses. Its acceptance is also incumbent upon anybody to whom it has been transmitted because of the attestation of authentic tradition, as we shall explain. Now God commanded us to take our time with our speculation until we would arrive thereby at these selfsame conclusions. We must, therefore, persevere in this standpoint until the arguments in favor of it have become convincing for us, and we feel compelled to acknowledge God’s Torah [that has already been authenticated] by what our eyes have seen and our ears have heard.
“So, then, even if it should take a long time for one of us who indulges in speculation to complete his speculation, he is without worry. He who is held back from engaging in such an activity by some impediment will, then, not remain without religious guidance. Furthermore, women and young people and those who have no aptitude for speculation can thus also have a perfect and accessible faith, for the knowledge of the senses is common to all men. Praised, then, be the All-Wise, who ordered things thus.”
In short, Saadia Gaon’s answer to your question is that while there was no INHERENT necessity for the giving of the Torah – insofar as all of its contents could be arrived at by rational speculation – there were major CIRCUMSTANTIAL reasons for giving the Torah. A handful of individuals (such as the Avos) managed to live in line with the Torah (albeit not in line with the technicalities of the halachic system) without revelation. Does that answer your question?
Dear Rambam Defender,
Answer #1:
Good point. You are not missing anything. My conclusions move away from the strict distinction that the Rambam derives from Chazal. I believe that the Rambam views the reactions of Man to mitzvos based on the level of the individual. The higher the level of avodah, the closer the will of Man desires the same as the mitzvah.
Answers #2 and #3:
The mitzvah of Torah Lishmah may be an exception to the general rule. Nonetheless, when you bentch esrog lishmah are you separating out the fact that Hashem commanded it? Lishmah means doing the mitzvah l'shem mitzvas Hashem. Not because you are in love with the esrog. Yahadus is a religion of mitzvos, commandments from a commander. It is not just a good deed that you are convinced is the truth. The Torah is true and Hashem is true and the Torah is true because Hashem revealed it to us.
Halakha-ism or Mitzvah-ism without Hashem is not Yahadus.
I think you are reading too much into the Perek Chelek passage.
The gist of Rambam in Chelek is: Do not study Torah for reward -- whether it is candy as a child or livelihood as an adult.
Again, Rmabam believes we should reach for a higher level -- lishmah. Lishmah does not exclude Hashem. Rather, Hashem is part and parcel of the lishmah.
Re: Rasag
I am aware of the passage you quoted, as was the Rambam, that we needed the Torah for pedagogical reasons before Man comes to the best way to behave on his own.
That is an answer to a different question. The question I discussed is: Why do we need the Torah to teach something morally right after we are mature enough on our own. One might argue, now that I have sekhel who needs the Torah? I can do it without the Torah now! Rasag does not answer that question.
You write: "Lishmah means doing the mitzvah l'shem mitzvas Hashem."
What do you mean by l'shem mitzvas Hashem? As far as I know, EVERYONE who picks up the arbah minim only does so because it is a mitzvas Hashem - yet, it is clear from the Rambam that not everybody does mitzvos lishmah.
Once I understand what you mean by l'shem mitzvas Hashem, then I can rethink what you've written and respond.
Dear Rambam Defender,
Lishmah means purity of purpose, for it's own sake, without nay ulterior motive or secondary purpose. As the Rambam says for Torah study, it should not be for any reward, such as candy or a livelihood i.e. money or honor.
Arbah minim may have other impure benefits such as, pride in the nicest or most expensive esrog to show off in shul or with neighbors.
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