Is there a fourteenth principle that the Rambam does not enumerate?
The number 14 has special significance for the Rambam. Rambam consistently classifies the mitzvos into groups of fourteen: fourteen books, classes, or categories. This scheme is first mentioned by Rambam in the Sefer ha-Mitzvos and is also used in the Mishneh Torah and the Moreh Nevuchim.
The Mishneh Torah is also referred to as Yad ha-Hazakah, alluding to the fourteen books; the numerical value of the letters Yud and Dalet (Yad) equal fourteen.
Yet, the Rambam has 13 ‘ikkarim, principles of faith, in his introduction to Perek Chelek. The most familiar version of these 13 are the Ani Ma’amin’s in the Siddur.
Many reasons have been offered for the use of 14 in Rambam’s writings.
Rav Dovid Cohen feels that the Rambam memorialized his brother and benefactor by using the number 14, the gematria of Dalet Vav Dalet, 4+6+4 = 14.
R. Yehoshua ha-Nagid (1310-1355, a descendant of Rambam), quoted by R. N.L. Rabinovitch in Mishneh Torah im Perush Yad Peshutah, Hakdamah u-Minyan ha-Mizvot (Jerusalem, 1997), 68, offers the following explanation: [The number fourteen] is an allusion to the positive and negative commandments. The numerical value of the 248 positive commandments in small numbers is as follows: 200 = 2, 40 = 4, and 8 = 8. 2+4+8 = 14. Similarly, the 365 negative commandments in small numbers are as follows: 300 = 3, 60 = 6, and 5 = 5. 3+6+5 = 14. R. Rabinovitch questions this explanation in light of the fact that it was not customary to refer to the different numbers 248 and 365 as the breakdown between the positive and negative commandments in the time of Rambam. Rambam’s thirteen ikkarim, the Principles of Faith, are also actually fourteen. The fourteenth principle, not listed with the others but nonetheless underlying them all, is the belief in free will. Rambam says in Hilkhot Teshuvah 5:3 that free will is an important principle and it is the pillar on which the Torah and the mitzvos stand. Perhaps, R. Rabinovitch argues, Rambam therefore chose the number fourteen as the numerical scheme for his writings.
--See Elimelekh Polinsky, “Parent-Child Relationships and Ta’amei ha-Mizvot” in The Legacy of Maimonides: Religion, Reason and Community edited by Yamin Levy and Sahlom Carmy (Yashar Books, 2006), pp.175-176 n. 4. http://www.yasharbooks.com/Legacy.html
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You said you where going to post MP3 of your Rambam Shiur And how about a Moreh Nevuchim Shiur?
Do you honestly believe that the Rambam's division of the Mishneh Torah and the 13 Ikarim was based on numerical symbolism?
In his introduction to the Mishneh Torah (43-44) the Rambam writes:
"[43] I have seen fit to divide this work into groups of the laws according to concepts, and I divide the groups into chapters dealing with one concept; each chapter I divide into paragraphs, so that they may be learned by heart. [44] Among the groups in the various topics, some groups include the detailed laws of a single Biblical commandment, when the commandment comes with many oral traditions that make up a single concept; and other groups include the detailed laws of many Biblical commandments, when all the commandments fall under one concept: For the organization of this work is according to concepts, and is not according to the counting of commandments, as will be clear to one who reads it."
The Rambam clearly states that the division of each sefer - as well as the distribution of the mitzvos within those divisions - are by concept. It is not too far fetched to assume that the division of the Mishneh Torah itself into 14 seforim is also in accordance with concepts. Indeed, the Rambam himself writes: "This is the division of the laws of this compilation in accordance with the concepts of the books."
To say that the Rambam's division of the Mishneh Torah or the 13 ikkarim was dictated by a desire to achieve numerical symbolism is - in my humble opinion - to malign the Rambam. If a doctor divided a surgical procedure into seven separate operations, simply because the gematria of his brother Gad is equivalent to four, we would say that he is crazy. The entirety of surgery must be dictated by chochma, not by symbolism. The same applies here.
Both the Rambam's words and common sense fly in the face of the theory of numerical symbolism espoused in the foregoing post.
Correction: "simply because the gematria of his brother Gad is equivalent to SEVEN" not four.
Addendum: Read the first chelek of R' Yosef Albo's Sefer ha'Ikarim. Even though the Albo disagrees with the Rambam's formulation of ikarim, one thing is clear: the formulation of ikarim is a science. The Albo's definition of an ikar is: that which makes the system unique. For example, he does not count Moshiach as an ikar because although it is an important Torah belief, it is not unique to Torah - Christianity also believes in an idea of Moshiach.
The question which must be asked here is: what is the Rambam's definition of ikkar? The Rambam alludes to his idea of ikkar at the end of his enumeration of the 13 ikarim in his commentary on Perek Chelek: "And when all of these fundamental principles are established within a person and his conviction in them is real, behold! – he has entered into the group of Israel, and it is an obligation to love him and have mercy on him, and everything which Hashem commanded us with concerning love and friendship. And even if he commits one of the sins out of desire or being overpowered by his inclination, behold! – he will be punished in accordance with the degree of his rebellion, but he has a portion in the World to Come, though he is one of the sinners of Israel. But when a person is doubtful about one of these fundamental principles, behold! – he is removed from the group, and denies the fundamental, and is called a denier, a heretic, and “one who uproots the shoot,” and it is an obligation to hate him and to destroy him. And concerning him it is stated, “For indeed those who hate You, O Hashem I hate them.”
In other words, the ikarim are those convictions which, when maintained by an individual, endows his soul with existence - existence as a member of Israel in this life, and eternal existence in the World to Come.
But that understanding is not enough to define the term "ikar" according to the Rambam. Many questions remain. For instance, it is pretty safe to say that Avraham Avinu did not believe in Nevuas Moshe, nor was he aware of the concept of Moshiach - yet, I am sure that the Rambam would hold that Avraham had a portion in the World to Come. Another question - an oldie but a goodie - is that the first three ikkarim (and arguably the fourth) are all one idea! In other words, it is impossible for a person to believe that G-d is One, but deny His incorporeality. Yet, for some reason, the Rambam chose to divide the idea of G-d into three yesodos. Another question is: why does the Rambam divide nevuah and nevuas Moshe into two separate ikkarim? Why doesn't he just have one topic - nevuah - and explain that there are different levels, Moshe Rabbeinu being qualitatively superior?
All of this clearly indicates that the Rambam's division of the 13 ikarim was based on a specific notion of what in ikkar is. To say that the Rambam's division was NOT based on an idea of ikkar, but on numerical symbolism, is simply untenable - kol shkein to include a fourteenth ikar which the Rambam himself did not mention in his formulation.
Postscript: I would like to address the argument that "The fourteenth principle, not listed with the others but nonetheless underlying them all, is the belief in free will. Rambam says in Hilkhot Teshuvah 5:3 that free will is an important principle and it is the pillar on which the Torah and the mitzvos stand."
In the Mishneh Torah the Rambam only identifies two ideas as "yesodos": G-d's existence and nevuah. Yet, at the same time, the entire section is called "Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah." Furthermore, in the koseres of Hilchos Teshuvah the Rambam writes: "the explanation of this mitzvah and the ikkarim that are dragged along with it, because of it, are in these chapters."
All of this indicates that the Rambam's use of the terms "yesod" and "ikkar" in the Mishneh Torah may be different than his use in the Peirush ha'Mishnayos. Thus, the aforementioned argument - namely, that since the Rambam calls bechirah an ikkar in the Mishneh Torah, he must have implicitly included it as the fourteenth ikkar in the Peirush ha'Mishnayos - is not so simple. Moreover, it seems that even within the Mishneh Torah itself the Rambam uses the terms "ikkar" and "yesod" in different ways.
Once again, the Rambam is a chacham. The terms he uses have definitions, and the definitions are based on concepts - not numerical symbolism.
One last word: At the end of his enumeration of the 13 ikkarim in the Peirush ha’Mishnayos, the Rambam writes the following:
“Review my words many times and contemplate them well. And if you imagine in your mind that you have already understood these matters after one or ten times, Hashem knows that you have deluded yourself. And do not be hasty here, for I did not write these matters haphazardly, but after much analysis, contemplation, and study of both proper and improper ideas, and I have summarized those in which one must have conviction and I have clarified them with arguments and proofs for each and every matter.”
After this admonition from the Rambam himself, in which he expressly states that did not write these matters haphazardly, but “after much analysis, contemplation, and study,” can you HONESTLY entertain the notion that the Rambam actually OMITTED a fourteenth ikar, based on the imprudent speculation that the whole division of the ikarim was based on numerical symbolism in the first place? May Hashem save us from casting such aspersions on chachmei Yisroel.
But make no mistake: my only criticism is of the theory espoused in your post. But if you were to ask: Why DIDN’T the Rambam include bechirah as a separate ikar – THAT would be a good question! But it is better to remain with a good question than to give a bad answer.
Clarification: I just read your profile and saw that you refer to yourself as an avid student of the Rambam. That being the case, allow me to clarify something:
This is the first (and only) post I have read on your blog. I know nothing about you, I have not read anything you have written, and I have not heard any of your classes. That being the case, let me make it clear that I am not passing judgment on YOU as a Rambam scholar. For all I know, you may be a brilliant talmid of the Rambam. But "ein l'dayan ela mah sh'einav roh'os" - I stumbled upon this one post, strongly objected, and stated my objections. I hope that you take my comments in a non-hostile manner - from one talmid of the Rambam to another - and not read into them any personal animosity. "Shma ha'emes m'mi sh'omro" - and object to the sheker, whatever its source.
Dear Rambam Defender,
First, let me say, the Rambam does not need a defense from anything that I wrote. In fact, I think you have gone on the attack against the wrong target. Moreover, there is no need to SHOUT. It does not add to advancing your opinion or getting wider acceptance of it with me or with any reader of this blog.
I do not understand why you are so hot and bothered by a discussion of the Rambam's use of 14 and multiples of seven in his writings. This is common knowledge frequently analyzed from which you could learn, even if you never heard of it before.
You agree that it is a good question: Why DIDN’T the Rambam include bechirah as a separate ikar? It certainly belongs with the other 13!
You may not agree or like all of the answers I included in my post. That is your prerogative. But I have not heard you offer a better answer.
As far as numeric siginificance applied by Chachamim in all generations in their writings and in their comments on the Torah goes, I am sure you are well aware of this method of intepretation and encryption in all of Torah literature. Are you implying they are not chachamim? Are you saying the Rambam does not stoop to that level? Is the Rambam higher in your opinion?
You wrote:
All of this indicates that the Rambam's use of the terms "yesod" and "ikkar" in the Mishneh Torah may be different than his use in the Peirush ha'Mishnayos. Thus, the aforementioned argument - namely, that since the Rambam calls bechirah an ikkar in the Mishneh Torah, he must have implicitly included it as the fourteenth ikkar in the Peirush ha'Mishnayos - is not so simple. Moreover, it seems that even within the Mishneh Torah itself the Rambam uses the terms "ikkar" and "yesod" in different ways.
The peirush hamishnayos was written in Judeo-Arabic. The terms used there and the terms in Mishneh Torah in lashon kodesh shed light on each other. They certainly do not preclude that the Rambam felt that bechirah is an ikkar. He makes it clear in hilkhos teshuva.
Why are you so bothered by that fact?
Do you have a problem with bechirah?
Kol tuv,
and Happy Defending, or, should I say, attacking?
Before responding to your response, allow me to make myself clear by summarizing my main points:
The Rambam writes that there are 13 ikarim. He concludes his exposition of the 13 ikarim by underscoring the extreme care he took in composing each and every word of his treatise. Thus, it is imprudent to disregard the Rambam's own words, and posit that he really held there are 14 ikarim. I then criticized the evidence you marshaled for your position. You mentioned three proofs: 1) the Rambam divides the mitzvos into 14 categories in the Mishneh Torah and Moreh Nevuchim, 2) the Gematria of the Rambam's brother Dovid is 14, and 3) the number 14 is an allusion to the 248 positive mitzvos and 365 negative mitzvos. My response to all three proofs is that the Rambam’s enumeration of 13 ikarim was based on a CONCEPT of ikar – according to which, it comes out that there are 13, no more and no less. To say that the Rambam’s number of ikarim was determined by symbolic considerations is to say that it was NOT determined by a concept of ikar.
This, I believe, is where we had a slight miscommunication. I was not criticizing the use of numerical symbolism per se, as you charged in your response. Nor am I bothered by the Rambam’s use of 14 in his writings, as you charged in your response. You are right: this method is common among Chachmei Yisroel. Nor was I ranking the Rambam in any sort of hierarchy of Chachamim, as you charged in your response. Rather, my point was that (a) the Rambam’s choice of 13 was determined by an idea of ikar, not by numerical-symbolic considerations, and that (b) to posit an unstated 14th ikar based on the theory that the Rambam WAS driven by numerical-symbolic considerations is entirely unwarranted. (Nor do I have a problem with bechirah, as you inquired in your response).
You wrote: “You may not agree or like all of the answers I included in my post. That is your prerogative. But I have not heard you offer a better answer.” The inability to come up with an answer does not invalidate the question. At this point, I am perfectly comfortable saying to you: “Why does the Rambam call bechirah an ikar in the Mishneh Torah and not count it as an ikar in the Peirush ha’Mishnayos? Good question. Tzarich iyun.”
Nevertheless, if you are interested in my thoughts on the matter, I will tell you what I am thinking at the moment. The Rambam’s 11th ikar is Reward and Punishment. In Hilchos Teshuvah 5:3 the Rambam writes as follows: “And this ikar is a tremendous ikar, which is the pillar of the Torah and the Mitzvah.” In the next halacha the Rambam explains why this the case: “If God were to decree upon a person to be a tzadik or a rasha . . . then how could He command us through his prophets, ‘do this’ and ‘do not do this’, ‘improve your ways and do not go after your wickedness’, when the person is already decreed from birth or by nature towards that thing in a manner from which is impossible to deviate? And what place would there be for the whole Torah in its entirety? And with what judgment and with what justice would he mete out punishment to the rasha or give reward to the tzadik – ‘Shall the Judge of All the Earth not do justice?’ (Bereshis 18:25)?”
It seems from here that the Rambam calls bechirah an ikar because it is the premise of the idea of Reward and Punishment. In other words, the 11th ikar is impossible without the idea of bechirah. That is why he calls it an ikar in the Mishneh Torah – because it is the root (premise) of the idea of Reward and Punishment. However, since bechirah is only a PREMISE of Reward and Punishment, the Rambam doesn’t count it in the Peirush ha’Mishnayos. The same is true from the premises of any other ikar. For instance, the Torah is founded on the epistemological doctrine of Realism – the existence of objective reality. Denial of objective reality is ipso facto a denial of all other ikarim. Another example is that the Torah is founded on the principle of non-contradiction – two opposite things cannot both be simultaneously true in the same way. Without the principle of non-contradiction, none of the ikarim could stand – it would be possible to believe in Hashem AND the Trinity without any problem. Yet, even though Realism and Non-contradiction are ikarim, which are the basis of the entire Torah, the Rambam doesn’t enumerate them. Why? Because they are conceptually PRIOR to the 13 ikarim, not ikarim themselves.
But, as I mentioned in a previous post, I’d rather remain with a good question than give a bad answer. While I don’t think the above answer is BAD, it is definitely incomplete. It doesn’t explain the Rambam’s definition of ikar, nor does it explain why the Rambam doesn’t even MENTION bechirah in the 11th yesod.
Adayin tzarich iyun.
Today I was delighted to come across a Rishon who criticizes the approach expressed in your post: R’ Yosef Albo. In Sefer ha’Ikarim 1:3 he writes:
“I have seen a statement made that the Rambam selected the number thirteen because the divine attributes are thirteen and because thirteen is the number of the hermeneutical rules by which the Torah is interpreted. But how exceedingly irrational is such an idea! [Namely,] that the Rambam neglected to count bechirah – which is an ikar according to his own writing – so that the number would not exceed 14; furthermore, this does not explain why he counts specifically those ikarim which are not NECESSARY ikarim, as we have explained.”
In this passage R’ Albo emphatically rejects as “exceedingly irrational” the notion that the Rambam omitted an ikar in order to achieve numerical symbolism – the very notion expressed in your post! His second argument corresponds to my second point: namely, that any explanation of the Rambam’s enumeration of 13 ikarim must be based on a conceptual definition of the term “ikar” – which, according to R’ Albo, is “a necessary, unique, structural essence,” as he explains throughout the first section of his book.
Note, however, that while R’ Albo acknowledges the strong question you raised about bechirah, he is not willing to go so far as to claim that the Rambam really DID have 14 ikarim. In other words, R’ Albo is modeh to the facts, but raises a kushya, rather than distorting the facts to avoid a kushya.
I am not claiming that SINCE R’ Albo rejects your position, THEREFORE it is false. I am merely showing that there is a Rishon who echoes my previous remarks.
Dear Rambam Defender,
You wrote:
It seems from here that the Rambam calls bechirah an ikar because it is the premise of the idea of Reward and Punishment. In other words, the 11th ikar is impossible without the idea of bechirah. That is why he calls it an ikar in the Mishneh Torah – because it is the root (premise) of the idea of Reward and Punishment.
The above analysis is exactly why I believe that bechirah is the missing 14th principle or, at the least, the most likely candidate.
I appreciate the point and view of R. Albo and that you have precedent for your approach from a rishon.
I do not think that the Rambam was driven by numeric schemes for the fun of it. I believe he used them to deliver hidden messages of sod to the discerning reader. I do not claim to be the interpreter par excellence of these sodos in the Rambam. However, we should be aware of their existence just in case some of them will become apparent after careful scrutiny.
You wrote:
However, since bechirah is only a PREMISE of Reward and Punishment, the Rambam doesn’t count it in the Peirush ha’Mishnayos.
That may be an answer to the question. My approach has been to post other answers, as well.
Kol tuv!
I asked my Rebbi why the Rambam doesn't count bechirah as an ikar. He referred me to the Sefer ha'Ikarim, and lo and behold - R' Albo gave almost the same answer that I did, albeit with a slightly different shade. I will quote his answer(Part I, Chapter 9):
"The principles of conventional law are freedom of choice and purpose. This is clear because why should the founder of a code of laws fix a punishment for those who violate the rules of the code if the violator is not his own master to do what he likes? Similarly how can a king or ruler of a country compel men to do good if a person is not his own master to do good or evil? Even those who deny spiritual reward and punishment admit that man has absolute freedom of choice which is not interfered with, and that by virtue of this freedom he can choose what he desires and can direct his activities to a given purpose.”
That was the setup. Here is the punch line:
“We can see from this that it is a mistake to regard freedom and purpose as principles of divine law. For though the latter presupposes freedom, freedom is not a principle of divine law qua divine; it is a principle of divine law by virtue of being a principle for all human acts and conventions and of legal customs by which a political community is kept in order and without which it cannot exist. We do not say that the AXIOMS are principles of divine law, though the latter presupposes them, as does any branch of learning and knowledge. In the same way though freedom is an essential dogma in divine law, it is not a principle thereof in so far as it is divine. For this reasons Maimonides does not enumerate it among the fundamental principles, though he believes that it is essential to divine law, as we said in chapter three. For only those dogmas are counted as principles which are fundamental to divine law as divine.”
Unless I am reading him wrong, it SEEMS as though R’ Albo is making the same point that I made, namely, that axioms or premises of ikarim are not, themselves, counted as ikarim. He is going further, however, and explaining the reason behind this principle.
Once again, I am not claiming that R’ Albo’s answer is the ONLY answer, but I am merely pointing out that the answer I gave is supported by a Rishon.
This investigation has been most enlightening!
Thank you for the fuller citation from R. Albo. This is an indication that the question is a good one and that this is a very thoughtful answer by a rishon.
Perhaps, the Rambam, too, was torn about including this as the fourteenth ikar. Hence, the 13 that we have plus the comment in Hilkhos Teshuvah.
Yes, it has been an enlightening discussion.
Thank you for starting this thread of comments.
Out of curiosity, may I ask: What is your background?
I began my Torah education after converting to Judaism at the age of 16. I attended 11th and 12th grade at Northwest Yeshiva High School (Seattle, WA), where I was taught by Rabbi Morton Moskowitz and Rabbi Bernard Fox. Rabbi Moskowitz introduced me to the Torah’s methodology in hashkafa and musar, while Rabbi Fox acquainted me with Talmudic methodology (a la Brisker derech). Both of these rabbis demonstrated a degree clarity and analysis which I had not seen in any other teachers. I found this approach to learning so attractive that after high school I decided to continue my learning at the institution which produced Rabbi Moskowitz and Rabbi Fox: Yeshiva Bnei Torah in Far Rockaway, NY. There, I continued to develop my understanding of the Torah’s hashkafa under Rabbi Israel Chait, and my understanding of Talmudic methodology under his son, Rabbi Pesach Chait (in addition to other rabbis). I am now 23-years-old, and in my fifth year of learning at Yeshiva Bnei Torah. I plan to go into chinukh – preferably at the level of high school.
What, if I may ask, is your background?
Small world. Rabbi Moskowitz was my rebbe, too, in 1961-62.
I wanted to express my gratitude to you for the discussion we had. It inspired me to start my own blog: http://kankanchadash.blogspot.com/. I hope that you'll return the favor by commenting (and critiquing) some of my posts.
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